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Sartre and Marx on Alienation: An Analysis and Comparison
of Their Theories (84 pp.)
Director: Fred McGlynn
This thesis analyzes both Sartre's and Marx's theories of 
alienation and presents a comparison of the two. It 
explores the question of whether alienation is, as Marx
depicts it, a historical phenomenon, or whether, as Sartre 
claims, it has a purely ontological basis.
For both Sartre and Marx, three key issues that bear on
the possibility of overcoming alienation are 
objectification, appropriation and the identification of the 
individual with the species. In deeming these 
impossibilities, Sartre has ontologized alienation; in 
foreseeing their realization in the communist society, Marx 
has historicized it. Thus, while there are many 
similarities in their analyses of alienation, their 
conclusions regarding the fate of alienated man are
drastically different. This work attempts to identify, 
illuminate and evaluate the presuppositions that underlie 
this difference.
In both their portrayals, "unalienated man" is
self-mediated man, i.e., man who chooses and creates himself 
(as being) through his interaction with the world. Sartre 
is faulted for dismissing the very real potential man has 
for a certain degree of "self-mediation"; Marx is similarly 
faulted for a naive hope that man can exist as 
"self-caused".
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
In commenting on what he perceives to be the 
incompatability of' Sartre’s existentialism with Marxism, 
Raymond Aaron states: "[R]evolution will not solve an
existentialist's philosophical problem, that of the dialogue 
of the individual with the absence of- God".[l] Upon first 
glance, Aaron seems to be right: the Sartre of Being and
Nothingness recognizes both the death of God and the freedom 
and responsibility that befalls man due to this loss, but he 
cannot reconcile man to this loss. In the absence of . God, 
man becomes the project to be God, a hopelessly futile 
enterprise. Marx, on the other hand, revels in the deity's 
downfall; the absence of God is not a problem but a 
thorough liberation prompting man to take back from God his 
own potential for achievement which Marx believed would 
culminate in atheistic communist society. How, then, can 
Marxist revolution appease the God haunted man of Being and 
Nothingness?
The answer, of course, is for Marxist man to become 
God, or, in Sartrean terms, to attain the being of the 
"in-itself-for-itself". In the following, I argue that this 
is precisely what Marx expects communist man to attain.[2]
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If, in fact, the Marxist state were possible, the 
existentialist's philosophical problem would be solved.
But upon closer examination, it becomes apparent that 
the "existentialist's philosophical problem", his "dialogue 
with the absence of God" is simply an expression of his 
alienation: his solitude, his unjustifiability and his
groundlessness. To solve the existentialist's philosophical 
problem would be to lay the groundwork for the overcoming of 
alienation. It is just this groundwork Marx claims to have 
laid. Thus the identification of the for-itself-in-itself 
with communist man has far reaching implications. In 
denying that such a being can come about, Sartre has left 
man permanently alienated; the individual becomes an 
isolated entity unable to commune satisfactorily with either 
his world or his fellow man. In claiming that Communist man 
will prevail, Marx has characterized alienation as a 
historical phenomenon resulting from particular alterable 
circumstances. The question that bears addressing is this: 
Has Sartre ontologized a historical situation, or has Marx 
historicized an ontological situation?
A comparison of Sartre's views on alienation with those 
of Marx, if not fully answering the question, delineates the 
issues involved in answering it. This thesis presents a 
delineation and discussion of such issues.[3]
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2.0 SARTRE: MAN AS ALIENATED
Before laying out the specifics of Sartre's theory, a 
brief comment on "alienation" is in order. To say that man 
is alienated, is to imply that he is estranged from some 
"x"; alienation is a relation, but a peculiar one, in that 
it implies a lack of relation (or as with Marx, a lack of 
Deceived relation) between two things. But when either Marx 
or Sartre refer to "alienated man", they are referring to a 
total alienation: the alienation of man from himself, from
his world, and from his fellow man. Any reference to 
alienated man is, therefore, a reference to man alienated in 
his totality.
Sartre, in Being and Nothingness, does not refer to man 
as alienated until he begins his discussion of "the Other". 
His depiction of man even prior to that discussion, however, 
is of a thoroughly alienated being. To avoid confusion 
between the former and the latter, it is helpful to make a 
distinction between "man as alienated", Sartre's 
characterization of man as estranged prior to the emergence 
of the other, and "alienated man", man as doubly alienated, 
i.e., as estranged from his "natural" but already alienated 
condition. This chapter deals only with "man as alienated".
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Man is, according to Sartre, a "lack", a being who 
"secretes a nothingness which isolates [him]".[4] Man, in 
his very being, is a "disengagement". In bringing 
nothingness into the world, man also brings alienation.
This grim picture of human reality is the inevitable 
outcome of Sartre's ontology which posits a radical 
distinction between the for-itself; human consciousness, 
and the in-itself, all that is other than human 
consciousness, the things of the world. Sartre's 
characterization of being-in-itself is similar to 
Parmenides' description of being in that being is 
self-identical and full.[5] It is neither necessary nor 
contingent; it "is-itself", "being is in-itself", "being 
is, what it is".[6] The in-itself has no relation to itself, 
it is a plentitude which exists not for itself but only for 
a consciousness.
The for-itself arises from the in-itself as the 
negation of the in-itself. [7]The being of consciousness is 
"in-itself in order to nihilate itself in for-itself... it 
is, in order to lose itself in a for-itself".[8] The being 
of consciousness is not located outside being but arises 
from it as a being who exists but "whose being is to be its 
own nothingness".[9] The for-itself exists as the 
"sacrificial act" whose existence is caught up in the
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nihilation of being.[10] The for-itself, being that which 
being is not, i.e., the nihilation of being, is a 
nothingness.
Thus Sartre's schism is not only a dualism, but an 
opposition. The two types, or "faces" of being, exist as 
the antitheses of one another, and as such, define one 
another. They are, in this sense, "internally related", but 
only through a negative internal bond. They define each
other not in terms of a positive identification between the 
two, but via a negative identification. The identity of
each is established over and against the other's. The 
for-itself is for-itself by virtue of not being in-itself, 
and the in-itself is in-itself by virtue of not being the 
for-itself. It is this negative internal bond that will 
characterize all of man's relations - to himself, to his 
world and to "the Other".
Sartre, however, in wanting to present a 
Phenomenological ontology, wishes to verify his ontology 
phenomenologically, that is, give evidence from lived
experience of the for-itself as a nothingness. He begins by
examining our "fundamental" attitude toward being.
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According to Sartre, man "stands before being in an 
attitude of interrogation".[11] Man's relation to being is 
that of the questioner to the questioned. What is 
significant about the question, for Sartre, is that it 
presupposes the permanent possibility of a negative reply. 
The question actually involves a double negation: 1) In
order to interrogate the questioned, the questioner effects 
a nihilating withdrawal from the questioned to "bring out of 
himself the possibility of a non-being".[12] 2) The
questioner nihilates the questioned - suspends its being 
"between being and non-being" in awaiting its response.[13] 
Either "x" is the case or "x" is not the case, and the 
-question, by its very nature, encompasses both 
possibilities, being and non-being.
To give further evidence of this ontologically potent 
"nothingness" smuggled into the world through the 
for-itself, Sartre points to a number of other "negatites" 
which themselves are manifestations of the nothingness of 
human reality.[14] The experience of such things as 
distance, absence and destruction are fraught with 
"non-being"; they all presuppose the negating power of 
consciousness. These and other "negatites" involve a 
gestalt of being and nothingness, with each alternately 
serving as foreground and background. For example, the 
notion of destruction implies a nihilation of the existing
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state in favor of a "remembered" previous state, which is in 
turn nihilated in grasping the actually existing reality. 
It is this shift in focus from being to non-being and back 
again that accounts for our experience of distance and other 
"negatites".
Sartre points to these and other experiences in 
claiming that nothingness is a component of the real. He 
argues that we encounter nothingness, and that, rather than 
it being the result of our negative judgement, it is that 
which conditions our negative judgments. The world then is 
dotted with "flickering[s] of nothingness" which the 
for-itself discovers.[15]
Since Sartre has defined being as a plentitude, a 
fullness which will not allow the "tiniest crack through 
which nothingness might slip in", the non-being encountered 
must be supplied by the for-itself.[16] Because "lack can 
come into being only through lack...[and] the in-itself 
cannot be the occasion of lack", the for-itself is 
identified as the "lack".[17] The for-itself, the "being
through which nothingness comes into the world", is itself a
nothingness.[18] In emptying out human reality, Sartre has
left the for-itself a mere witness to being. It does not
partake in being, but remains a flight from being, a 
disengagement whose "flight" reveals being. Although
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consciousness is inevitably a consciousness of something, 
and therefore a consciousness of the in-itself, it remains 
perpetually "unclogged" and lucid, gaining priveleged 
knowledge of the in-itself.
But the for-itself is not only a pure "presence" to
being, it is also condemned to be pure presence to itself. 
The nothingness which separates us, disengages us from 
being, is also that which prevents the for-itself from 
coinciding with itself - the for-itself is an escape even 
from itself. This escape, according to Sartre, takes place 
via the temporalization of the self.
Sartre predicates temporality to the for-itself by
claiming that we "exist" the three temporal dimensions 
simultaneously. We are at once our past, future and 
present. We are our past "in the mode of not being it"; 
that is, we are our past to the extent that past deeds and 
situations, the dead facticity of what has been must be 
claimed by us.[19] It is this past which allows us our 
"identity"; we are an American, a banker, a mother, a 
teacher but only to the extent that we have been all of
these. But we are not simply our past. We are, at any 
moment, a flight, a ripping away from our past toward our 
future. We cannot identify ourselves with out past because 
we are witness to it, inevitably torn from it the moment it
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is posited as "past".
We are simultaneously our present, which Sartre
describes as "presence of the for-itself to 
being-in-itself".[20] But, since this "presence" always 
involves a "disengagement from", it is again a mere
witnessing to all that is present. The present, then, is 
the presence to our past, the in-itself of the temporal 
dimension, as well as presence to all that of which we are 
conscious at any given moment. The present as presence is a 
"flight" from being.
We are also our future as that which we are
"not-yet".[21] The future is the realm of possibility which 
the for-itself flees toward. Sartre claims that we are 
constituted by our possibilities, that is, we "live" our 
possibilities. I am my project. It is my project, i.e., 
that which I intend to do or become, that shapes me. It is 
that which structures my world and guides my activity. "The 
future is revealed to the for-itself as that which the 
for-itself is not yet..." [22]
But I project myself into the future only to find it 
perpetually receding before me. A "future" day that has 
arrived in the present loses its character as future; 
future qua future, therefore, never arrives, but must exist 
as anticipation. It is an anticipation, however, that
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shapes me and gives my present meaning.
Thus the human being as temporal being is an escape 
from the past into an unrealizable future. He is a 
sustained flight to nowhere leaving a trail of dead 
in-itself behind him. He is a mere presence to himself and 
to his world, a nothingness fleeing the in-itself.
Sartre equates this flight, this disengagement, i.e., 
man's alienation from being and self, with freedom: The
for-itself is that being "who can realize a nihilating 
rupture with the world and with himself...and the permanent 
possibility of this rupture is the same as freedom".[23] My 
consciousness throws me outside the causal order. The 
in-itself can never be said to be the cause of my action, it 
is always I who chooses to act as I act. I transcend the 
in-itself toward my projects, and in doing so confer meaning 
upon the in-Itself. The in-itself has no "ready-made", 
pre-established meaning of its own and therefore cannot move 
me toward any particular action unless I, in pursuing my 
project, deem that such an action is warranted. The 
in-itself, then, becomes significant only in the light of my 
project, and my project, which itself can be transcended and 
evaluated, is freely chosen.
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But there are several quirks in all of this. The 
for-itself, even though "disengaged", is far from being 
disinterested. It "grasps itself as an incomplete being", 
but is displeased about its being as "lack".[24] 
Consequently, the for-itself is not simply a flight from 
being; it is also a desire for and a pursuit of being. It 
is a "pursued-pursuing", an escape from that which would
nihilate its freedom toward that which would ground it.[25] 
It escapes being merely to pursue it.
Thus the for-itself is both a flight and a project. It 
escapes the in-itself merely to project itself toward a 
situation that would effect its totality, that would allow 
it the being of the "in-itself- for-itself". But before 
discussing this all important but impossible being, it is 
necessary to clarify what Sartre means by "the project".
Sartre distinguishes between two types of project:
primary and secondary. Secondary projects are those goals
or ends which we freely choose to attempt to bring into
being. These projects are syntheses of being and 
nothingness. The for-itself in order to "pro-ject" itself 
nihilates the givens of the present situation in favor of a 
projected or imagined situation the for-itself wishes to 
bring about. An individual nihilates "x", first in his 
imagination, and if he is successful, later in reality, in
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favor of some "y". Any activity, mundane or otherwise, such 
as sewing a shirt, washing a car, raising a child, building 
a house, becoming a lawyer, etc., can be characterized as a 
secondary project.
The primary or fundamental project (there is only one) 
is "the quest for being". [26] This "veritable irreducible", 
this project to capture or aquire being, is the overriding 
end toward which all secondary projects aim.[27] It is, 
therefore, the transcendent meaning behind all acts - 
whatever I do, I do in order to lay claim to being.
This laying claim to being, however, is not a 
straightforward affair. The for-itself does not want to 
become in-itself, for that would be to surpass itself toward 
the nihilation of itself as consciousness, and "it does not 
want to lose itself in the in-itself of identity".[28] But 
it is unhappy with its status as nothingness and wishes to 
substantiate itself. It desires, therefore, to attain the 
"impossible synthesis of the for-itself and the in-itself; 
it would be its own foundation not as nothingness but as
being and would preserve within it the necessary
/
translucency of consciousness along with the coincidence 
with itself of being-in-itself". [29] The for-itself, then,
arises as the desire to be the "in-itself- for-itself".
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This synthesis, however, involves more than the mere 
"mingling" of in-itself with for-itself, or even the 
incarnation of the for-itself as in-itself. The 
in-itself-for-itself, the being of God, requires that a 
certain relationship exist between the for-itself and 
in-itself. According to Sartre, we want to be the 
"in-itself which would be to itself its own foundation".[30] 
That is, we, as for-itself, wish to found ourselves as 
in-itself.
Thus far we have established that the 
in-itself-for-itself project that defines man translates to 
the desire to be the foundation of the in-itself. This, in 
turn, needs "decoding".
In order for "x" to found "y", "x" must stand at the
source of "y"'s being; "x" chooses to bring "y" into being.
The self seeks such a "foundation" because it appreheands
itself "as not being its own foundation."[31] Sartre argues
that this revelation is at the very heart of consciousness,
and he goes so far as to redefine the cogito in these terms:
..this apprehension of being as a lack of being in 
the face of being is first a comprehension on the 
part of the cogito of its own contingency. I 
think, therefore I am. What am I? A being which 
is not its own foundation, which qua being, could 
be other than it is to the extent that it does not 
account for its being.[32]
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Thus it is myself as contingent, as unfounded, as 
existing as an absurd given and a flight that sets the 
for-itself on its mission to found itself. The for-itself 
is a "flight ahead toward itself as self cause".[33] The 
for-itself wants to substantiate itself, not by embracing 
its absurd facticity, i.e., all that it is without having 
chosen it, but by rejecting it and attempting instead to 
become that impossible being - that being "which would be to 
its facticity in the same relation as the for-itself is to 
its motivations", the being who would choose his own 
facticity.[34]
But the for-itself is more than the project to found
its own being qua being, i.e., its own facticity. It is the
project to found the entire world. According to Sartre, the
for-itself apprehends "the total world as that which is
lacking to the for-itself in order that it may become
in-itself-for-itself."[35] Nothing short of the entire world
would render the for-itself the "totalized totality" which
it inevitably seeks.[36] Therefore, the for-itself
corresponds to an attempt on the part of being to 
remove contingency from its being. But this 
attempt results in the nihilation of the 
in-itself, because the in-itself cannot found 
itself- without introducing the self or a 
reflective, nihilating reference into the absolute 
identify of its being and consequently 
degenerating into for-itself.[37]
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Sartref here, has created what might be called the myth 
of the for-itself. The for-itself arises from the being of 
the in-itself as an ontological mutant. The dumb and 
paralyzed in-itself has sent it on a mission - to found its 
(the for-itself1 s) being, with instructions not to return 
until the mission has been accomplished. The mission, 
however, is an impossible one and the for-itself can be to 
the in-itself only its witness, and never its foundation. 
The two then exist this impoverished and frustrating 
relation - they are condemned to exist forever apart.
Thus it is not only its own existence the for-itself 
wishes to save from contingency, but it is also the "choice 
of founding the being which it encounters. This means that 
the for-itself as an individual enterprise is a choice of 
this world as an individual totality of being...."[38]
Man's choice of himself as a nothingness, that which 
allows him to give meaning to his situation and to his world 
is not enough to satisfy him. He seeks a more substantial 
existence. The for-itself, then, wants to exist as an 
in-itself that the for-itself has chosen and brought about. 
The in-itself-for-itself is a being who is in total control 
of himself and his world and therefore might be equated with 
man's fundamental desire for both understanding and control.
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Sartre's claim is that the being of the
in-itself-for-itself perpetually haunts man as something he
is not, and as such defines him:
In the human world, the incomplete being which is 
released to intuition as lacking is constituted in 
its being by the lacked - that is by what it is 
not. It is the full moon which confers on the 
crescent moon its being as crescent, what is not 
determines what-is.[39]
But alas, man's fundamental project is a failure. God 
must be nothingness (in order for him to be a consciousness 
and therefore a freedom); yet He must exist substantially, 
as the in-itself. The desire to be God' involves the unity
of the fundamentally "incompatable characteristics of the 
in-itself and the for-itself".[40] Sartre has left man a
"useless passion".[41]
Man's alienation, because he exists as both lack of 
being and project to capture being, is two-fold. His lack 
establishes him as mere presence to being; his interaction 
with being is futile. He remains bound to being only 
through an internal negation, only as consciousness of it. 
His project toward being, on the other hand, "alienates" him
from his "lack", i.e., from his already alienated but "real"
/
being. Man's nature is such that in trying to substantiate 
and found his being, in trying "to be", he merely further 
alienates himself. He exists not only as a refusal to be
but as an attempted refusal of that refusal. If, in fact,
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there were an "evil genius", as postulated by Descartes in 
his methodic doubt, he could not have created a more absurd 
being than the for-itself.
Thus far, we have given a brief overview of Sartre's 
ontology, and have shown that the project of the
in-itself-for-itself is an impossible one. But let us 
temporarily disregard Sartre's ontological argument 
"disproving"" the possibility of the in-itself-for-itself 
(that argument which states that there cannot be a being who 
is simultaneously nothingness and plentitude) and examine 
the other grounds Sartre gives for dismissing the
possibility of attaining that being which would see the 
integration of man and world. Examining these issues will 
give us the "meat" of Sartre's views which we will later 
juxtapose to Marx's views. But first, a brief summary of 
Marx's conception of man and his theory of alienation.
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3.0 MARX'S THEORY OF ALIENATION
Marx broke with the Western philosophic tradition that 
had identified man as the "thinking being", locating man's 
essence in his capacity to reason. Man, according to Marx,
is "homo faber", man the maker. What is unique in man is
not merely his ability to reason, but, according to Marx, it 
is his "conscious life-activity" which "directly
distinguishes man from animal".[42] In effect, Marx focuses 
on the character of man's activity rather than on the 
character of his mind in defining his "essential" and
distinguishing attribute. Man differs from other animals in 
that his activity is self-conscious activity: "Man makes
his life-activity itself the object of his will and of his
consciousness.".[43] Man is conceived as not merely a
thinker, but a maker whose projects are directed and
conceived in thought. But it is his nature to contemplate 
the world only in so far as he intends to engage himself in 
it. His consciousness is only a "theoretical" duplication 
of what is and what he hopes to bring about through his
interactions with the world. Man is primarily a needy 
"suffering" creature whose rational capacities aim at the 
fulfillment of those needs.
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But Marx’s characterization of "need" is more than a 
description of basic animal drives, though it includes them 
as well. And although Marx does not discuss his conception 
of need at length, he does make a number of distinctions and 
qualifications.
First, he distinguishes between "natural need" and 
"human" or "species" need, the former being those we have in 
common with the animals and the latter being unique 
expressions of our humanness. Marx contends that we not 
only have needs that animals do not (such as the need to 
produce and create, even when our "natural" needs have been 
met), but that natural needs, i.e., eating, procreating, 
etc., take on a uniquely human character under the right 
circumstances. Second, for every need there is a
corresponding "power" which seeks expression via the need. 
Man is, in this sense, empowered; he posesses innate 
abilities that can be expressed and developed in fulfilling 
his needs. In eating, for example, I am satisfying my 
hunger and exercising my consumptive powers. Every
satisfaction involves both an "appropriation" of the object, 
and an exercise of powers.
"Appropriation" here is a key term, and as we shall 
see, one of the key issues which bears upon the possibility 
of overcoming alienation. According to Oilman,
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'"appropriation* is Marx's most general expression for the 
fact that man incorporates the nature he comes into contact 
with into h i m s e l f [44] Man, in fulfilling his needs, 
appropriates the nature he interacts with.
Since Marx has defined productive activity as man's 
"life activity" , this need to produce (which itself serves 
other needs) bears close examination.[45] According to Marx, 
labor serves to "objectify" itself and the individual 
laboring: "Labor's realization is its objectification".
[46] In effect, labor manifests itself in the product of 
labor, for labor's product is "labor which has been embodied 
in an object".[47] Elsewhere, Marx refers to labor as man's 
duplication of himself: "The object of labor is...the
objectification of man's species life: for he duplicates
himself not only, as in consciousness, intellectually, but 
also actively, in reality".[48]
Marx's use of "objectification" here seem fairly 
straightforward. Man's powers, which themselves are not 
objects, express themselves objectively through the objects 
they have produced or created. These powers are simply the 
measure of man; in their interaction with the world, they 
express what and who he is. Thus, the creation of objects 
is really the creation of the self - man's powers combine 
with the world to express his powers, and, thereby, himself.
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They are concrete manifestations of the being of man. This 
drive to create "a world of objects" is that which 
establishes man as "homo-faber".[49]
Given this characterization of human nature, it is 
inevitable that Marx's analysis of alienation is centered 
around both the laboring process and the object of 
production. If productive activity is "the activity by 
which man becomes himself", i.e., develops and expresses his 
powers, then it is essential that this activity takes place 
in accordance with man's nature.[50] As we have stated, 
man's "species character" is his capacity to engage in "free 
conscious activity", when man's productive activity cannot 
be characterised as such, he is deprived the means of
"self-creation" and alienation abounds. The following is a 
very brief summary of the various forms of alienation that 
arise from the state of production found in a capitalist 
system:
3.1 Alienation Of Man From His Productive Activity
In a capitalist society, man loses the freedom to 
direct and control his own productive activity. His
interactions with the world are no longer "conscious and
free", but coerced. The worker, if he wishes to avoid
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starvation, must sell his labor for a wage which, in turn, 
becomes the means of his subsistence. Because of the 
existence of "private property" in a capitalist society, 
(i.e., because the means of production are privately owned) 
the worker is unable to sustain himself in any other way; 
the world and all its "stuff", that which man "lives on", 
belong to another - the capitalist.[51] The worker labors 
not for himself but for the capitalist. His laboring 
capacities, because he owns nothing to work upon, nor any 
tools to work with, have become useless to him unless he can 
market them. Consequently, labor "produces not only 
commodities: it produces itself and the worker as a
commodity..."[52] In order to survive, man sells his labor 
as a "thing"; labor becomes "an object, an external 
existence...it exists outside him, independently as 
something alien to him...it becomes a power on its own 
confronting him".[53]
The effects of rending labor from man are devastating: 
"...in his work, therefore, he does not affirm himself but 
denies himself, does not feel content but unhappy, does not 
develop freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies 
his body and ruins his mind."[54] Man, deprived of free 
productive activity, (of, as Oilman puts it, the "effective 
medium between the individual and the outer world") loses 
touch with his own "essence".[55] He is told what to do,
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when and how to do it. Any failure on his part to respond 
to these demands can cost him his wage, his only means of 
subsistence. The objectification which does result from his 
productive activity is distored.[56] According to Marx, in 
capitalist labor, "the human being objectifies himself 
inhumanly".[57]
3.2 Man's Alienation From His Product:
In capitalism, man's alienation from his product takes 
several forms. First, since the worker has no say over the 
specifics of production, i.e.,the "what" "when" and "how" of 
the actual production process, the product which is simply 
the "summary of the activity of production" confronts him as 
an "alien object".[58] The product takes on the same alien 
character as does labor. According to Marx, the product of 
an alien process can only itself exist as alien, "as 
outside" of the worker. What is interesting here, for our 
purposes, is not that Marx sees the product as "outside" the 
worker but that he sees the possibility of the worker and 
his product as constituting a unified whole. This point 
will be developed and explored later.
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Second, the more obvious estrangement man experiences 
from his product results from the fact that man does not own 
what he produces. The worker, despite whatever need he may 
have for that which he produces, is denied access to it. 
Nor does he have any say over what becomes of it. Man and 
his product are but "two ships passing in the night" - their 
interaction brief and meaningless, their relationship a 
matter of chance and not choice. The worker "spends 
himself" on an object which is taken from him.
But neither does the capitalist have complete control
over the product. While it is his capital, ambition and 
greed which initiate and sustain the whole capitalist 
enterprise, the market dictates the "whats" and "hows" of 
production. As Oilman points out, the relationship of man 
to nature becomes a displaced relationship: "Whereas man,
being a man, has the power to control nature, through 
excercising this power, his product is now in a position to 
control him". [59] The worker, deprived of his free
productive activity, takes on the character of an inert 
thing, and the product, infused with the magic of
capitalism, reigns over men.
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3.3 Man's Alienation From Man
According to Marx, man's conflict with man does not 
arise as the consequence of some inherently flawed nature, 
but from the antagonisms that inevitably accompany 
capitalist production. These antagonisms are pervasive and 
exist between classes as well as between members within each 
class.
The class conflict between the capitalist and worker 
is, of course, the most obvious and immediate conflict. If 
the worker is estranged from the object of production, it is 
because "someone else is master of this object, someone who 
is alien, hostile, powerful, and independent of him..."[60] 
The capitalist, in all his greed, steals the worker's 
product and his life. It is he who has robbed the worker of 
his world and who at least appears to be directly 
responsible for the worker's impoverished existence. The 
capitalist keeps wages as low as possible in order to 
maximize profit. The worker's poverty is that which makes 
the capitalist rich.
Antagonism between individuals within a class takes the 
form of competition. The capitalists, of course, compete 
with other capitalists for markets. The worker competes 
with other workers for jobs, for housing and for whatever 
scarce resources he can find. One man's gain, at any level
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of the social order, represents another man's loss.
Also, the link that exists between workers in the 
production process is obscured. The worker doesn't feel he 
is working with others in the creation of a product, but 
sees himself in isolation, working only for a wage. This 
obscuring of actually existing relations gives rise to 
"egoistic man", man who sees himself as "self-sufficent" and 
unrelated to the rest of society.[61] He does not experience 
himself as "in community"? he is an individual pitted 
against other individuals who represent a threat to his 
well-being.
3.4 Man's Alienation From His Species
"Man's alienation from his species" subsumes, to an 
extent, the other three categories of alienation mentioned 
above. It is an expression of the alienation of man's own 
nature that results from his alienations from his productive 
activity, his product and his fellow man. To say that man 
is alienated from his species means that his existence is 
less than human, that "the unique configuration of relations 
which distinguishes the individual as a human being has been 
transformed into something quite different...".[62] The 
overcoming of man's alienation from his species, then, will
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inevitably involve the overcoming of the types of alienation 
mentioned above. "Species man" is unalienated man.
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4.0 COMMUNIST MAN
Thus far we have defined the "species being" of 
communist man only negatively, in terms of the overcoming of 
man's alienation outlined above. But before an 
identification between communist man and Sartre's 
in-itself-for-itself can be made, it is necessary to take a 
closer look at what Marx means by the positive transcendence 
of alienation.
According to Marx, the communist state will bring about 
"the complete return of man to himself".[63] This return of 
man to himself, equated with the "genuine resolution of the 
conflict between man and nature and between man and man", is 
brought about by the "positive transcendence of private 
property".[64] This means that private property "persists as 
the relationship of the community to the world of 
things".[65] In effect, the entire world becomes available 
to all men, not for their exclusive use, but for their 
common use. "Life activity" which under capitalism "stands 
in the service of private property" will now be served by 
communal property.[66] That is, property becomes valuable 
and available as it serves human appropriation and 
objectification. The world is restored to the species, the 
product is restored to the individual, and the human essence 
is restored to man. The world is once again freed for man's
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appropriation of it - he can sustain and express himself in 
it.
This is a very brief and cursory description of the 
basic transformation Marx believed would be respsonsible for 
the metamorphosis of capitalist society into communist 
society. For our purposes, however, it is not necessary to 
give a more detailed account of the specifics (i.e., the 
economic and political changes) involved in such a 
transformation. We are more interested in how this 
transformation will be instrumental in overcoming 
alienation. The following are three basic results Marx 
claims will be realized via this transformation:
1. Man's product will be the objectification of 
himself. This means that in his productive activity man 
will produce his real or "species being". In contrast to 
the distorted objectification that takes place in capitalist 
society, communist man will not lose himself in his object 
but will find or create himself in it.
The central difference between capitalist and communist 
"objectification" lies in the fact that the latter is a 
"free" project while the former is not. Because the 
individual is no longer forced to sell his labor to the 
capitalist in exchange for a wage, and because his basic 
needs will already be met (advanced communism comes about
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only after the problem of scarcity has been solved and the 
redistribution of wealth completed), he is left with ample 
time, energy and resources to pursue the activities of his 
choice.[67] In the absence of restrictions placed upon the 
individual by the capitalist system and animal necessity, 
"each man deposits part of his personality, the distinctive 
contribution of his powers, in all he does".[68] Productive 
activity, for the most part, becomes creative activity; an 
individual's product would spring from his own inner 
resources, talents and inclinations, not from the dictates 
of the market.[69] Therefore, his product, be it a hand 
crafted piece of furniture, a painting, etc., becomes a 
powerful expression of who and what he is; it is a far 
richer "objectification" than the automobile or the box of 
Oreos fresh off the assembly line. In communist production, 
there is a much greater opportunity for the individual as 
individual to express his unique talents and sensibilities 
than in the capitalist system. Instead of stunting and 
masking the individual, communist production, because it 
occurs "freely", develops and reveals him.[70]
But it is not only individual men whose being will be 
objectified, but the being of man as a species. The "human 
world", the world transformed by man serves as the 
objectification of the being of man, as evidence of his 
powers and his development. Thus the individual, in
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objetifying himself as an individual species being, 
contributes to the objectification of the species.
2. The character of man's appropriation will become
fully human. This amounts to a qualitative change in man's
interaction with the world which allows him to incorporate
the being of nature into his own being. According to Marx,
"the transcendence of private property is therefore the
complete emancipation of all... senses...[71]
Each of his human relations to the world - seeing, 
hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling, thinking, 
observing, experiencing, wanting, acting loving, 
in short all of his individual being...are in 
their orientation to the object, the appropriation 
of that object.[72]
This revolution in human sensibility would enable man to
appropriate nature upon immediate contact with it.
This is not to say that "appropriation", in some form, 
does not occur in capitalist society - it does. But it is a 
weak and incomplete appropriation. Marx depicts capitalist 
man, according to Meszaros, as "continuing] his attention to 
the sphere of mere utility...Objects that confront the 
isolated individual appear to him with their utilitarian 
sides only..."[73] "Human" enjoyment, however, implies a far 
fuller and richer appropriation of the world. As Marx 
points out: "It is obvious that the human eye gratifies
itself in a way different from the crude non-human eye; the 
human ear different from the crude ear, etc."[74] That is,
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refined human senses have an alltogether different grasp on 
the world than do those conditioned by the narrow concerns 
of a capitalistic society. Thus, according to Oilman, for 
communist man to "capture" a sunset, "it is not necessary to 
paint, write or sing about it. It becomes [his] in the 
experiencing of it".[75]
"Human" appropriation, then, can be equated with the
appropriation that takes place via highly developed senses.
Communist man, liberated from the constraints of capitalist
production and the struggle for survival is free to develop
his powers, including his senses, to capacity. In communist
society, man's appropriation will be moved "toward the ends
inherent in his powers..."[76] Marx's hope was that with the
coming of communism,
the richness of subjective human sensibility (a 
musical ear, an eye for beauty of form - in short, 
senses capable of human gratification, senses 
confirming themselves as essential powers of man) 
[would be] either cultivated or brought into 
being.[77]
Then and only then will man's powers allow for a full 
and "human" appropriation of the world.
3. The individual will undergo a "conceptual
revolution" which, as Oilman puts it, will involve the 
individual "supply[ing] himself with a new subject, the 
community, for all but his most personal activities".[78]
Page 33
The individual, while not losing his status as individual, 
will come to know himself as an "individual species being" 
who acts and lives for, with and through the species.
This identification of the individual with his species 
will again, be the outcome of the "positive transcendence" 
of private property. It is in grasping the social character 
of the object that man awakens to his own social nature? 
the individual labors for and with others and they for and 
with him.[79] While the natural relationships and 
interdependencies ivolved in the production of an object 
were present in capitalist production, they were obscured by 
the existence of private property. The individual labored, 
as mentioned above, only for a wage, for money; because he 
did not own his product and had no say over it, his product 
served to estrange him from rather than bind him to others.
The capitalist, via the product, stole the worker's life
from him. In advanced communism, however, the world (this 
includes man's product) is available for communal
appropriation. what is acted upon is not private property, 
but a shared world. Any creation or production on the part 
of an individual is an alteration or transformation, not of 
a privately owned domain, but of a social world. In this 
sense, all men create one object the world - for one 
subject - the community. As Marx puts it, it is only in 
communist society that "nature exists for him [the
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individual] as a bond with man". [80]
This "coneptual revolution", brought about by a 
heightened awareness of interdependeny and mutuality in the 
actual production process, is the demise of the privatized, 
egoistic individual. The illusory "self-sufficiency" of 
capitalist man is replaced by "species being". The 
individual is no longer viewed "in abstraction from its 
relationships with society", but understands himself as an 
integral part as well as a reflection of the society.[81] 
Thus individual accomplishments lose their egoistic 
character; any particular achievement is a credit to both 
the individual and the society that has nurtured him and
allowed for his development. According to Marx, "Man is in 
the most literal sense of the word a zoon politikon. not 
only a social animal, but an animal which can develop into 
an individual only in society."[82] Society is the mediator 
between the individual and his achievements; it is that 
which allows for the expression of his individuality, not
that which precludes it.
Oilman, in pointing to the inevitable dependence any
individual has on his society, gives the following example:
A scientist who spends his lifetime in a
laboratory may delude himself that he is a modern 
version of Robinson Crusoe, but the material of 
his activity and the apparatus and skills with 
which he operates are social products...The very 
language in which a scientist thinks has been
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learned in a particular society.[83]
Any activity, then, whether performed with a multitiude 
of others or in solitude, is "social" activity, and all 
skills are "social" skills. An individual does not develop 
in isolation.
Again, it is not that such reciprocal relations do not 
exist in a capitalist system - they do; as described above, 
the relations are obscured and the individual believes 
himself an isolated atomized entity. In a communist 
society, however, these relations are emphasized, and it is 
then that "competition as we know it [will give] way to 
cooperation as we have still to learn about it".[84] 
Individual ends and social ends will be alligned.
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5.0 COMMUNIST MAN AS THE IN-ITSELF-FOR-ITSELF: UNION OF
MAN AND WORLD
As we have shown in our discussion of Sartre, the being 
of the in-itself-for-itself, that being which haunts man as 
that which he is not, can be expressed in several ways. The 
first (and this is the one we are temporarily suspending) is 
the synthesis of nothingness (for-itself) with plentitude 
(in-itself). When viewed in this light, the 
in-itself-for-itself becomes the impossible being because it 
is an attempt to unite within one entity incompatible 
characteristics or modes of being. The second expression, 
and the one we will be concerned with, is the 
in-itself-for-itself as the being who is its own foundation. 
We have said that this is a being who chooses itself not "as 
a nothingness", as with Sartre's for-itself, but as 
in-itself, as that which is substantial and objective. This 
is precisely what communist man does - he chooses himself, 
founds himself as being.
As Sartre noted, this being, in order to enter into a 
founding relationship with itself, must exist at a distance 
from itself. This "existence" at a distance, for Marx, is 
accomplished in two ways.
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First, it comes about via the productive process. Marx 
has defined man's essence as his "free productive activity", 
but as we have seen, what man creates in the process is 
himself objectified. Through this process, man becomes 
nature; he is naturalized not only because in freely 
producing he is fulfilling his natural essence, but also 
because he has imprinted himself upon nature. He exists, 
then, at a distance from the object, but, at the same time, 
he "becomes the object".[85] Man is affirmed by his creation 
without which he would not be who he is.
In addition to this, we have seen in the previous 
chapter that communist man objectifies and thus chooses 
himself freely. He stands at the source of himself, and 
chooses himself in the creation of his product.
Second, man's appetancy for existing at a distance from 
himself is also satisfied through man's "appropriation" of 
the world. As we have described above, communism brings 
about a radical transformation of the senses. The "human 
senses" are those "affirming themselves as essential powers 
of man"- powers of appropriation.[86] And since 
"appropriation" at this advanced stage is the means by which 
man incorporates the being of nature into himself, it is 
another way man "becomes nature". But Marx's appropriation 
is not a consumption. Man appropriates nature while leaving
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it intact - it is, for the most part, a nondestructive 
appropriation. For example, the "human eye" appropriates 
the world, without, depleting it. It incorporates the world 
into itself, yet exists distanced from it. Communist man, 
then, not only sees himself in the world he has freely 
created, but feels the world in himself. The distance 
between subject and object has been bridged.
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6.0 COMMUNIST MAN AS THE IN-ITSELF-FOR-ITSELF: THE
INDIVIDUAL'S IDENTIFICATION WITH THE SPECIES
An individual's identification with his species 
accomplishes a number of things: First, it puts individuals
"on the same side as one another", i.e., individuals are no 
longer in conflict, working against each other, but working 
for and with one another for the good of the species.
Second and more important for our analysis, this
identification brings about a heightened sense of autonomy -
a unique sense of "self-creation". According to Marx,
A being only considers himself independent when he 
stands on his own feet; and he stands on his own 
feet when he owes his existence to himself....But 
I live completely by the grace of another if I owe 
him not only the maintenance of my life, but if he 
has, morever, created my life - if he is the 
source of my life. When it is not my own 
creation, my life has necessarily a source of this 
kind outside it.[87]
This is an expression of what Kierkegaard refers to as 
"angst", what Heidegger refers to as "guilt" and what Sartre 
terms "unfoundedness" - that sense of not standing at the 
source of your being - of being dependent and unjustified 
that can lead to either a religious consciousness, as with 
Kierkegaard, or to despair, as with Sartre.[88]
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Marx, however, seeks a different remedy - the 
identification of the individual with the species man. As 
he puts it:
Now it is certainly easy to say to a single 
individual what Aristotle has already said: You
have been begotten by your father and mother; 
therefore in you the mating of two human beings - 
a species act of human beings - has produced the 
human being. You see, therefore, that even 
physically, man owes his existence to man.[89]
But this linear regression at some point must be 
replaced by an awareness of the circular movement of our own 
creation: "You must also hold on to the circular movement
sensuously perceptible in that progression, by which man 
repeats himself in procreation, man thus always remaining 
the subject".[90]
As individual, I am "species being" man, brought about
by man. In this sense the circle is closed, and
self-creation established. Marx's species consciousness has
its "metaphysical" consolation built in:
..for the socialist man the entire so-called 
history of the world is nothing but the creation 
of man through human labor, nothing but the 
emergence of nature for man, so he has the 
visible, irrefutable proof of his birth through 
himself, of the process of his creation.[91]
If you look beyond man and nature, to inquire about the
genesis of man and nature, "you are abstracting...from man
and nature", and the "abstraction from the existence of
nature and man has no meaning".[92] This "abstraction",
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which, according to Marx, is the habit of alienated 
consciousness, finds no place in communist society. Species 
man is concerned only with the creation of himself, his 
species and his world.
Communist man is indeed his own foundation, or at least 
the consciousness of himself as a species being defines him 
as such. He freely creates and chooses himself via 
objectification, becomes the world through appropriation and 
owes even his birth to himself. He is not the victim of 
existential angst for he is unalienated man- he has attained 
the being of God.
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7.0 SARTRE: THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF OBJECTIFICATION AND
APPROPRIATION
Thus far we have attempted:
1. to equate the being of the in-itself-for-itself 
with unalienated man: that being who chooses and founds 
himself as being.
2. to show that Marx's communist man, as nonalienated 
man, is an expression of Sartre's in-itself-for-itself.
3. to show specifically what conditions Marx feels 
will be met in communist society that will allow man to 
transcend his alienated condition. As we have seen, the 
transcendence of alienation will involve: 1) man's 
objectification in the world 2) man's appropriation of the 
world 3) the identification of the individual with the 
species, man. Next, we shall juxtapose Sartre's views on 
these three issues with those of Marx outlined above. As we 
shall see, it is in deeming all three "impossibilities" that 
Sartre ontologizes alienation; it is in claiming that the 
communist state will bring about these conditions that Marx 
has historicised it.
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We have already said that for Sartre, man is the 
project to capture being. Sartre occasionally referred to 
this quest for being as the attempt by man "to objectify his 
being"; that is, he attempts to ground himself by choosing 
himself as in-it-self, This attempt at objectification can 
occur in an infinite variety of ways, but for our purposes, 
I will categorize them in two groups.
The first, (and these we will not be greatly concerned 
with) are the "bad faith" projects. These are attempts by 
the individual to deceive himself, to lie to himself about 
the ambiguous nature of his being, to "freeze" or solidify 
himself as being either pure transcendence or only facticity 
in-itself. Either the self identifies itself with its 
freedom, i.e., attempts to become a freedom in the mode of 
being a thing, thereby refusing to claim past deeds and 
mistakes or 2)the self wholly identifies itself with its 
facticity, its past mode of being, ignoring the fact that it 
simultaneously exists as a transcendence, a freedom, and as 
such, is a being who is free to change himself at any 
moment.
The second category, while not consisting of explicitly 
bad faith projects, are none-the-less, failed projects. 
According to Sartre, the desire for being manifests itself 
in three "original relations": the desire to do, the desire
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to have and the desire to be. It is his discussion of the 
"desire to do", the individual's attempt at objectivation 
through productive activity, that closely parallels Marx's 
views.
Sartre's analysis of the creative process and the 
motivation behind the creative process is similar to Marx's 
position. One creates an object, according to Sartre, "to 
enter into a certain relationship with it".[93] I experience 
myself as the source of the creation; "It is not enough 
that a certain picture which I have in mind should exist; 
it is necessary as well that it exist through m£".[94] I 
encounter the thing created, then, as emanating from me; I 
stand to it as its own foundation, as the source of its 
being. It carries "my mark".[95] It is, for an indefinite 
period of time, "my" thought, but my thought objectified - a 
thought which "sustains itself alone in being", a thought 
"active when I'm not actually thinking it".[96] Thus I enter 
into a double relation with the object: "I stand to it then
in the double relation of the consciousness which conceives 
it and the consciousness which encounters it".[97] But what 
I hope for is an objectification that is at once myself, yet 
outside myself. As Sartre puts it: "What I wish precisely
is that this in-itself might be a sort of emanation of 
myself while still . remaining in itself."[98] I want to 
encounter myself as object existing outside myself, or, to
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put it in Marxist termsf I want to "contemplate [myself] In 
a world [I have] created".[99]
As both Sartre and Marx recognize, such an occurence 
does mend the rift between subject and object. The self 
becomes world and the world self. If, in fact, 
objectification of the self can occur, one looks directly to 
the world to find oneself in it. In effect, there is no 
self if there is no world upon which the individual can 
confirm, create and discover himself.
But Sartre is quick to burst this bubble:
But creation is an evanescent concept which can 
exist only through its movement. If we stop, it 
disappears. At the extreme limits of its 
acceptance, it is annihilated; either I find only 
my pure subjectivity, or I encounter a naked, 
indifferent materiality which no longer has any 
relation to me.[100]
My creation, upon inspection, is alien to me; it is not me
but falls away as other.
Thus, in creating, I am actually seeking a more stable 
relationship with being. I create something in order that I 
may own it: "One does (=makes) an object in order to enter
into a certain relation with it. This new relation can be 
immediately reducible to having".[101] Created objects, 
then, "interest me only to the degree that the bond of 
creation which I establish between it and me gives to me a 
particular right of ownership over it."[102]
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Possession proves a more stable bond, according to 
Sartre, for several reasons. First, ownership amounts to a 
perpetual creation of the object-. And while Sartre 
acknowledges that it is a degraded creation, he insists, 
none-the-less, that ownership involves creation in the sense 
that the "object possessed is inserted by me into the total 
form of my environment; its existence is determined by my 
situation and by its integration in that same 
situation".[103] In effect, ownership of an object defines 
and transforms its existence. The individual remains, 
therefore, the source, in this diluted sense, of the object 
he owns - he remains at the foundation of himself to the 
extent that he is that being which he possesses.
Second, Sartre defines possession as the means by which 
we attempt to "appropriate" objects, i.e., the means by 
which we attempt to absorb them into ourselves. In fact, 
Sartre more or less equates possession with appropriation, 
possession is the synthetic internal relation which "effects 
the unification of the possessor and the possessed... to 
possess is to be united with the object possessed in the 
form of appropriation".[104] In possession I am the 
"possessor-possessed dyad", a unity of "self and not-self"
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Given Sartre's characterization, possession, initially, 
seems to bring about the the synthesis of the 
in-itself-for-itself that Sartre claims is man's fundamental 
project, thereby overcoming man's alienation from world. By 
making creation a component of possession, the individual 
stands at the foundation of what he possesses. By equating 
possession and appropriation the individual fuses with that 
which he possesses. Possession, then, "is a magical 
relation; I am these objects which I possess, but outside, 
so to speak, facing myself; I create them as independent of 
me, what I possess is mine outside of me..."[105] Thus, 
concludes Sartre, "I am the foundation for myself in so far 
as I exist as an indifferent in-itself in relation to
myself".[106]
For Sartre, unlike Marx, it is not the creator/created 
dyad that man seeks in overcoming alienation, it is the bond 
between possessor and possessed. The creation of an object 
is merely a transition toward a more stable relationship 
with the object - that of ownership. Thus the
objectification of self through productive activity is
ephemeral and delusory, and inevitably gives rise to the 
project of possession.
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But, alas, the project of possession fails as well, and
it does so on two grounds. First, to the extent that
possession is a creation, it is a failure. An individual's
creation, as we have seen, inevitably falls short of
becoming himself; the created object does not become the
subject but falls from him as alien and wholly independent
of him. Second, to the extent that possession is
appropriation, it can only be an "ideal" appropriation;
"real" appropriation is an impossibility. An individual
cannot appropriate anything, that is, take something into
its being, without destroying that which it appropriates.
Thus a successful appropriation would involve destruction of
the in-itself, a consumption. In that case the self would
no longer exist at a distance from itself via possession;
the in-itself would have collapsed into subjectivity and
lost its character as in-itself. If, on the other hand, the
object of appropriation is not consumed or wholly
assimilated by the for-itself, it, as with creation, falls
away from the for-itself as that which the for-itself is
not. To "possess" an object, then, is to possess it ideally
or symbolically:
There can be found in it no positive enjoyment 
outside its symbolic value; it is only the 
indication of a supreme enjoyment of possession 
(that of a being who would be its own foundation) 
which is always beyond all the appropriative 
conduct meant to realize it.[107]
Consequently, the bond between possessor and possessed is
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internal and ontological, but once again negative. My 
creations or possessions only define me negatively in terms 
of what I am not. Man's attempt to ground himself, to 
objectify himself, to bring himself and the world together 
is, once again, a failure.
In denying the possibility of objectification and
non-destructive appropriation, Sartre has left man 
permanently estranged from the world. And if he cannot 
objectify himself in being, he remains estranged from
himself - a nothingness, a mere flight.
Marx on the other hand, attributes this estrangement to 
historical circumstances - the capitalist relations of 
production. Our objects are alien to us only because they 
are not an accurate reflection of our real powers. We
cannot fully appropriate the world because our orientation 
to the world is distorted and our senses await emancipation. 
These maladjustments, however, will be overcome in communist 
society. Who, if either, is correct?
Another way of framing the issue and asking the 
question is to view both portrayals in their teleological 
orientation. It is in doing so that we see the striking 
similarity between these two theories of man, better 
enabling us to pinpoint precisely what it is that sends the 
two reeling off in different directions.
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For Marx, the individual as well as the society aims at 
the "establishment of himself [or itself, in the case of 
society] by practical activity", which is the realization of 
man's essence.[108] It is in this sense that man's 
"existence preceeds his essence"? he is born in order to 
realize his essence, to create and recreate himself in his 
productive activity. If he is not allowed the free 
expression of himself through his products, if he is not 
allowed human "objectification", he exists as unfufilled and 
alienated. Man's activity as well as the overall social 
structure, according to Marx, should be guided by this end.
Similarly, Sartre's for-itself arises as the project to 
be God, that "deep seated structure of human reality" that 
is rooted in his very ontology.[109] And while Sartre 
adamantly insists that he has not given a theory of human 
nature, the nothingness which was to preclude man's essence 
is, in fact, that which has established it. Man's existence 
does not precede his essence; they arise simultaneously. 
But it is the former which determines the latter - it is his 
quest for being which defines him, fixes him and condemns 
him to this impossible mission. Sartre's for-itself, like 
Marx's communist man, acts purposively - in attempts to 
objectify his being. But Sartre's is a perverse teleology: 
man aims at an end that is beyond his achievement.
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What, then, is the central issue that leads these two 
philosophers, whose theories, to a large degree, parallel 
one other, to such different conclusions?
The answer lies in how each characterises "the lack" 
involved in man's being. As we have seen, both agree that 
man's alienated condition results from the absence of 
objective being, or in Sartre's terms, the "in-itself". For 
Marx, this lack is expressed via "need"; for Sartre, 
"desire". Sartre, however, interprets man's existence as 
desire as an indication that he lacks being. "The existence 
of desires as a human fact is sufficient to prove human 
reality a lack".[110] This argument, weak as it is, leaves 
man groping toward the in-itself in attempts to collar and 
claim it as its own. Given this characterization, that is 
all man can hope to do.
Marx, on the other hand characaterizes man's lack as 
"need". But this "need" is multifaceted. As we have seen, 
it expresses not only the desire for its object, but it 
expresses an existing power that manifests itself via the 
need as well. For every need, there is an accompanying 
power that seeks expression through the need. Need, then, 
loses its passive character - it is not a complete void in 
search of fulfillment, but is fraught with potential in the 
form of power. [Ill]
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"Objectification" for Marx is, then, an expression of 
being, not a capturing of being. It becomes possible 
because man exists not as nothingness, but as embodied 
potentiality. There is no total void to fill, but only 
needs to satisfy and powers to express and develop. This is 
not to say that man merely expresses what he was prior to 
his activity - he is always something more after his 
interaction with the world than prior to it. Man develops 
and changes himself as he encounters and changes his world. 
Objectification is, therefore, both an actualization of 
potential, and thereby a creation of an actual self visible 
in objective form.
Also, if Marx's portrayal of need is more accurate than 
Sartre's characterization of desire, then "doing" does not 
reduce to "having". That is, if our needs prompt us to 
actualize our innate capacities, then they ultimately aim at 
more than their mere fullfillment which, -for Sartre, 
involved "having"? they also aim at the fulfillment of 
potential that exists in the form of our powers. In fact, 
if one wanted to take Marx's "homo faber" to extremes, one 
might conclude that "having" reduced to "doing" - that is, 
our desire for some "x" is valuable in that it prompts us to 
develop our appropriative powers. When viewed in this 
light, having, i.e., the actual procurement of something is 
secondary to the actual doing - the expression and
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actualization of potential.
Finally, if man exists as embodied potentiality rather 
than lack, his appropriation of the world does not have to 
express itself as the destructive appropriation of Sartre's 
for-itself which culminates in the desire for exclusive 
possession of all with which it comes into contact. If our 
senses, which have been retarded to a large degree by our
less than human world, are really powers of appropriation
themselves, then interaction in the form of nondestructive 
appropriation between man and the world can exist.
The evidence, thus far, favors Marx's position. 
Clearly Sartre has gone too far in depicting the for-itself 
as nothingness to the exclusion of the many real powers man 
exhibits. As Desan points out, one of the more striking 
paradoxes of Sartre's portrayal of human reality is that"the 
nothingness of the for-itself is extremely active"[112] And
all activity is not in vain. To the extent that it is
unaliehated activity, it does develop capacities and express 
(though not exhaustively) what and who a person is.
In reducing "doing" to "having", Sartre has ignored the 
very real satisfaction that can be gained from activity 
undertaken for its own sake. Clearly man's preoccupation 
with "having" which Marx saw as the "sheer estrangement of 
all...senses", does not have the ontological priority that
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Sartre has given it.{113] Ownership, the "immediate, 
one-sided gratification", which does not serve to develop 
human capacities is primarily a .capitalist 
preoccupation.[114] An examination of past and present 
"non-materialist" cultures attests to this. Sartre himself, 
while initially reducing "doing" to "having", inadvertently 
asserts the priority of "doing" in defining having as a 
"continued creation". In effect, his initial claim that 
"doing" reduces to "having" is negated by his next assertion 
that "having" actually amounts to a perpetual creation. 
Thus the "having" becomes valuable only in so far as it is a 
diluted form of "doing". Because in creating an object, we 
express and create ourselves, it is the creation of 
something and not ownership over it that remains 
fundamental.
It also seems that Marx is correct in claiming that: 
"Private property has made us so stupid that an object is 
ours only when we have it- when it is direcly possessed, 
eaten, drunk, worn inhabited...when it is used by us."[115] 
This impovershed condition is not the human condition. In 
Marx's terms, the ear becomes a "human" ear, the eye a 
"human" eye when it achieves a high state of development. 
It is only then that man, in his every contact with the 
world, appropriates the world and develops his powers in 
doing so. The proof of this interaction, the exchange of
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being between man and world need not lie in the destruction 
of the latter, but can be seen in the development of the 
former. Even today we see that this type of appropriation, 
while not prevalent, is possible. An eye, an ear, a palate 
can be trained to "absorb" more from the world than can an 
untrained eye, ear, palate, etc. The musician can far 
better appreciate or in Marxist terms "appropriate" a 
symphony than can the nonmusician. He literally "gets more" 
from it than do those whose untrained ears limit their 
capacity for enjoyment and appropriation.
To this extent, we will agree, that Sartre has mistaken 
the historical for the ontological subject. It is 
capitalist man (or man in advanced industrial society, in so 
far as he has adopted the capitalist sensibility) who 
asserts the priority of "having" over "doing", who is, for 
the most part, unable to objectify himself properly in his 
creative activity. It is capitalist man whose powers remain 
undeveloped, whose inner emptiness leaves him a void that he 
seeks to fill through a consumptive and destructive 
appropriation. It is capitalist man who cannot see himself 
in a world that he is rapidly destroying.
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8.0 SARTRE ON THE OTHER: "ALIENATED MAN"
Sartre's analysis of the Other also precludes the 
possibility of the identification of the individual with the 
species, the "conceptual revolution" which would render all 
"activity and mind, both in their content and in their mode 
of existence [as] social".[116] As has been stated, 
"species" consciousness is another means by which communist 
man establishes himself as source of himself.
In one sense, Sartre's position regarding the Other (as 
individual or society) is the antithesis of Marx's; social 
consciousness, i.e., the awareness of my existence with and 
dependence on others is not the remedy for alienation, but 
is instead its source. In fact, Sartre first refers to man 
as "alienated" in his discussion of the Other. (Recall the 
distinction made in chapter 2 between "man as alienated" and 
"alienated man". Up to this point, we have been discussing 
Sartre's depiction of "man as alienated".)
Sartre's dualistic ontology, taken to its logical 
conclusion, seriously limits the possibilities for 
intersubjectivity. Consciousness, as a nothingness, is a 
mere witness to being. It possesses no being of its own, 
and can confer being upon nothing - it exists simply as the 
revelation of being. The in-itself, as an absurd 
plentitude, is simply that which is witnessed. Human
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reality is ambiguous, however, in that it is both in-itself 
and for-itself, though lacking in integration. Any 
individual has a body and a past, and to this extent he 
exists as an in-itself, a fixed thing. But an individual is 
also, at any given moment, much more than his body or his 
past - he is a transcendence; he surpasses his body toward 
the world, and transcends his past toward the future. He is 
a flight, a negation, a ripping away.
Given this structure, there are but two things that can 
occur when one individual encounters another. The first 
individual can serve as a witness to the other, deeming him 
an object in the world, though an object endowed with 
peculiar characteristics, or he may experience himself as 
objective, that is as being object for another. The latter 
experience is made manifest through "the look", the gaze of 
another. According to Sartre, it is only under the look of 
another that an individual can realize his 
"being-for-another", that is his being-as object.
The look, however, is doubly significant: this gaze
which reveals my objectness to me also reveals the other as 
an alien consciousness which has constituted me as this 
"thing" in the world, this "seen" object. But these two are 
related, the first constituting the second: to experience
myself as an object for another is to simultaneously
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experience the other as the alien constituting
consciousness. As Sartre puts it:
I in the recognition of my objective state have
proof that he has this consciousness. By virtue
of consciousness the Other is for me
simultaneously the one who has stolen my being
from me and the one who causes 'there to be' a 
being which is my being.[117]
The recognition accomplished through the other's look 
is lived in shame, and it is through this shame "that I 
discover an aspect of my being", the "unjustifiable 
being-in-itself that I am for the other".[118] I am not for 
myself, that is apart from the gaze of another, this fixed, 
transcended being, whose projects can be second guessed and 
undermined; I am the constituting consciousness, the center 
of the world, my own project to be. But when looked at, I 
become aware "that I am vulnerable, that I have a body which 
can be hurt, that I occupy a place...in short that I am 
seen."[119]
In light of man's project to be God, such a revelation 
is indeed embarassing and disturbing. But it is also 
alienating. My body ceases to be pure "body-for-itself",
i.e., my body as lived by me as my orientation to the world. 
It is now body as object, as seen, as witnessed. Similarly, 
I am no longer a pure transcendence - the other fixes my 
transcendence by transcending it. My transcendence 
"acquires a nature by the sole fact that the Other confers
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on it an outside" [120] My projects are second guessed and 
thereby fixed. And while I am not for myself what I am for 
the other, I am forced to claim the being which the other 
has conferred upon me, as alien yet belonging to me.
Since it is the other's consciousness which constitutes 
me as "being-for-others", a real, yet previously undisclosed 
facet of my being, Sartre contends that it is he who founds 
me in this being. Consequently, my project in relation to 
the other is to unite with him, to join in the founding of 
my being. This project can take two basic directions.
The first is masochism. The individual attempts to 
capture the freedom of the Other by making himself the 
unsurpassable object. This is, from the start, a bad faith 
project. Any individual is always more than an object, and 
an inappropriate emphasis on one's "thingness" to the 
exclusion of that which constitutes him as a transcendence 
is a deception. But it is also necessarily a failed 
project. The seducer wants to capture the Other's freedom 
as freedom. But this would require that the Other freely 
limit himself to the choice of the seducer - in acutality, a 
cancellation of his freedom. Thus the Other's freedom qua 
freedom cannot be caught, and the seducer again becomes 
aware of the terrible contingency of his being. He cannot 
be the unsurpassable because it is not he who contstitutes
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himself as unsurpassable - it is the other, and the other, 
as a freedom, can always surpass the seducer towards other
ends, rendering the latter inessential or worse yet, a mere
instrument.
The other form the project takes is, in its extreme
form, sadism. This is an attempt by an individual to not 
only recover his transcendence but to assimilate the freedom 
of the Other in doing so. The sadist aims at the capturing 
of the Other's consciousness not as pure transcendence, but 
as "the incarnated-Other". This incarnation is attempted 
through inflicting pain on the Other by the sadist. As
Sartre puts it, "in pain facticity invades consciousness", 
and therefore it is in hopes of creating "a freedom captured 
by flesh" that the sadist inflicts pain.[121] But sadism is 
rendered a failed project as well. Incarnation is an 
impossible achievement; one's freedom cannot be captured 
through the control of another's body. The victim's freedom 
remains "on principle out of reach".[122] In the victim's 
look,
the sadist experiences the absolute alienation of 
his being in the Other's freedom; he realizes 
then not only that he has not recovered his 
being-outside but also that the activity by which 
he seeks to recover it is itself transcended and 
fixed...through and for the Other whom he wishes 
to enslave.[123]
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The above portrayal is pertinent to our analysis 
because it indicates that the other, again, in the form of 
the individual or society, is encountered, not as a part of 
oneself, or that to which the self is in relation as part to 
a whole, but as other - an alien consciousness in all its 
alterity. It also indicates that an individual cannot exist 
with the other in harmony, but only over and against him as 
"subject" or subservient to him as "object".
Sartre makes this claim, in part, as a refutation of 
Heidegger's portrayal of man as the "Mitsein". the self as 
"being with others". Sartre's characterization of 
Heidegger's Mitsein partially paralells Marx's depiction of 
"species being". Sartre's critique of the former, 
therefore, actually involves a critique of the latter. It 
is with this in mind, that we pursue his analysis of 
Heidegger.[124]
According to Sartre, Heidegger "substitutes" 
"being-with-others" for "being-for-others".[125] That is, he 
replaces the "for-other" relation, i.e., that structure 
which simeltaneously reveals the self as object and the
l
Other as subject, with a "with-other" relation. The latter 
"does not intend the reciprocal relation of recognition and 
conflict which would result from the appearance of a 
human-reality other than mine in the midst of the
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world."[126] It implies "not a frontal opposition but rather 
an oblique interdependence".[127] In effect, Sartre is 
claiming that Heidegger's "with-other" relation overlooks 
the oppositional character of the encounter with the other.
Sartre points to this "oversight" in Heidegger's
depiction of both the authentic and inauthentic self. The
inauthentic self, the "they self" is that which
I realize my being-with in the anonymous form of 
the 'they'...The world refers to me as a sort of 
impersonal reflection of my unauthentic 
possibilities in the form of instruments and 
complexes of instruments which belong to 
'everybody' and which belong to me in so far as I 
am 'everybody'...[128]
Thus I exist inauthentically as "interchangable", as an 
"anybody". My unique possibilities are absorbed by the 
"they"; my "being-with" is not "the relation of one unique 
personality with other personalities equally unique", but as 
one anonymous being to another.[129] I exist then not as a 
"me" opposed to a "you"- inauthentic man exists in the 
"social unity of the they".[130]
Similarly, Heidegger's authentic expression of
being-with-others symbolized by a "crew" rowing a boat lacks
any reference to the existence of conflict among
individuals. In order to "be-with" others authentically,
I launch out toward death with a resolute-decision 
(Bntschlossenheit) as toward my own most peculiar 
possibility. At this moment I reveal myself to
Page 63
myself in authenticity, and I raise others along 
with myself toward the authentic.[131]
I realize my unique possibilities not over and against the
Other, but with and through him. It is here that
Heidegger's analysis parallells Marx's. The intersubjective
realm "made manifest to them [the crew] by the common goal
to be attained" is where the individual realizes his own
peculiar and unique possibilities:
It is on the common ground of this co-existence 
that the abrupt revelation of my 
'being-unto-death' will suddenly make me stand out 
in an absolute 'common solitude' while at the same 
time it raises others to that solitude.[132]
For Marx, of course, it is not the retrieving of one's 
death that will allow for the authentic expression of 
individuality, it is free productive activity. But for both 
Heidegger and Marx, "authentic" or "unalienated" existence 
involves an awareness of being bound with others on "common 
ground". The unique individual is not an "I" opposed to a 
"you", but, according to Sartre, still a part of a "we". 
Thus, concludes Sartre, Heidegger has failed to account for 
the existence of conflict in his analysis of authentic 
existence.
Sartre also faults Heidegger for depicting this 
"solidarity" as ontological. The Mitsein. according to 
Heidegger, is an ontological structure of Dasein? it is our 
way of being in the world. To be in the world is to be in
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the world "with-others" (as opposed to Sartre's
"for-others"). Sartre takes exception to this view. While
he acknowledges that we "encounter certain emperical states
of our being...which seem to reveal a co-existence of
consciousness rather than a relation of opposition", he
insists that "it is precisely this coexistence which must be
explained". He asks:
Why does it [the "being-with" structure] become 
the unique foundation of our being? Why is it the 
fundamental type of our relation with others? Why 
did Heidegger believe that he was authorized to 
pass from this emperical and ontic establshment of 
being-with to a position claiming co-existence as 
the ontological structure of my
"being-in-the-world"?[133]
If, in fact, Heidegger's "being-with" structure cannot 
account for the existence of social conflict, Sartre seems 
justified in asking these questions.[134] It is unsound to 
base one's ontology on certain experiences to the exclusion 
of other conflicting experiences. Sartre, however, having 
critiqued Heidegger for a one-sided analysis of the social 
realm, proceeds to commit the same error. But rather than 
overlooking the existence of conflict in social relations, 
he focuses on it exclusively, swinging the pendulum too far 
in the other direction.
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Sartre, having already deprived the Mitsein of its 
ontological status, none-the-less acknowledges that the self 
can apprehend itself as in unity with other selves in two 
ways. The first is the experience of the "Us-Object". The 
basic structure of this phenomenon is the same as the 
original experience of the other, except that there are more 
than two individuals involved. A group existing in close 
proximaty spatially, financially, socially, etc., can be 
"collectivized" by a third party who "looks" at them, that 
is transcends their situation and defines them as "clumped 
together". The third party has objectified these
individuals, not as individuals, but as a group. They have
become "the poor", "the workers", "the oppressed" by virtue
of their situation as it exists in contrast to the alien 
third. Given Sartre’s initial analysis of the relation of 
self and other, the Us-Object exists bound not by a sense of 
community, but by a "collective alienation".[135]
The second is the experience of the "We-self", easily 
translatable into Heidegger's Mitsein or Marx's "Species 
Being". It is established just as both Heidegger and Marx 
depict it, through a joint effort to attain a common end. 
We are bonded "across a material object 'to be
created'".[136] We work together to bring about a 
transition, and become conscious of ourselves as a unity. 
My end is simultaneously their end; there is one project,
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one transcendence - the group. The key to this experience,
according to Sartre, is the rythym: My transcendence
melts into the general rythym of the work or of
the march of the concrete community which
surrounds me....I do not utilize the collective 
rythym as an instrument...I do not transcend it 
toward my possibilities; but I slip my 
transcendence into its transcendence...[137]
But Sartre is once again quick to dismiss this ray of
hope. This latter experience is merely a
psychological, subjective event in a single 
consciousness...it does not appear on the 
foundation of a concrete ontological relation with 
others and does not realize any Mitsein.f1381
It is, as with man's "bond" with the world, only "symbolic",
"a way of feeling myself in the midst of others". [139] It
is a "fleeting experience without metaphysical
bearing".[140]
At this point Sartre, although failing to mention Marx 
by name, seems to directly address Marx's position: The
"We-Subject" is merely a "psychological experience realized 
by an historic man immersed in a working universe and in a 
society of a definite economic type".[141] This renders 
commuinist man's social bonds merely psychological, and 
"species" consciousness is left an illusion of sorts.
Instead of the communist state being the realization of the 
human essence, might it not be a grand scheme to mask the 
most fundamental of all social experiences - conflict?
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Clearly, Sartre thinks so. There is never any "my 
getting out of my self" or others getting out of their 
selves, but only this illusion brought about by "the
material channeling of my transcendence which disposes me to 
apprehend it as extended and supported by the other
transcendences.."[142] The subject/object dualism in 
Sartre's philosophy is rarely so blatant as here: my
subjectivity remains hopelessly hidden and unreachable - it 
can not be grasped via its "material chanellings" and it is 
in mistaking one's subjectivity for the latter that the 
illusion of the "we" comes about.
Sartre's analysis of the other has dashed the final 
hope - man's project to found his own being through the 
other has failed. For Sartre, this means that an individual 
cannot bond with another, cannot absorb or be absorbed by 
the Other's transcendence which has constitued the former's 
objectivity. No inidividual, therefore, can join in the
founding of himself. For Marx, this would mean that the
individual cannot identify himself with his species - he 
owes his existence and his life to something or someone 
else. His source of himself remains outside of himself.
Sartre, here, in dismissing the possibility of the 
"we-self", thereby disallowing Marx's species consciousness, 
has once again defied his phenomonolgy in favor of his
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ontology. When it comes to the experience of the "we", the 
"experience qua experience" which is at the basis of all 
phenomonolgical accounts is deemed merely "psychological" or 
"subjective", as existing only in individual consciousness. 
The valid phenomonological account, which supposedly is the 
basis for Sartre's ontology, takes a back seat, and is in 
fact degraded and stripped of any epistemological let alone 
ontological status. The experience of the "we" of which 
Sartre himself has given a splendid phenomonological account 
is, of course, at odds with Sartre's dualistic ontology and 
has, therefore, been sacrificed to it.
Also, in addition to demoting the phenomonological, 
Sartre, in not allowing the "material chanelling" of 
transcendence to account or express the actual acting 
subject, has killed any possibility of intersubjectivity. 
If my subjectivity cannot be expressed in my object nor even 
in my activity, then there is no way the other can know me, 
let alone exist in some sort of union with me.
Sartre, then, has given evidence of possibilities or 
expressions . of intersubjectivity but has immediately 
discounted them. Man is permanently isolated from man, just 
as he is permanently isolated from his world. "The essence 
of relations between consciousnesses is not the Mitsein: it
is conflict".[143] Sartre's metaphysics once again reigns.
Page 69
9.0 CONCLUSION
The critical focus of this paper thus far has been on 
Sartre. He has been found guilty of ontologizing what seems 
to be alterable circumstances and has left the individual 
permanently isolated from his world and from his fellow man. 
For Sartre, there can be no unity between man and world nor 
man and man short of total assimilation, no internal 
relationships uniting them except for the negative bonds 
whereby the for-itself acquires its identity via what it is 
not. If, in fact, this were the only type of bond man had 
with the world and with the Other, then the more familiar 
one became with a place, the more apart he would feel from 
it - the more time he spent in the company of others, the 
more isolated he would feel from them. This is indeed 
contrary to experience. Given the proper circumstances, we 
begin to feel ourselves an integral part of our 
surroundings. This sort of unity establishes identity, it 
does not invalidate it.
While Sartre's phenomonological descriptions have 
verified this unity, his ontology has disallowed it. Sartre 
has given vivid descriptions of 1) the encounter of the self 
in the "created object" and 2) the experience of a "mutual 
transcendence" that can occur in the joint project. Both 
experiences were found lacking any ontological foundation,
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and consequently, were rendered "illusory" and "symbolic". 
If Sartre's ontology were really derived from his 
phenomonolgy, it would have to account for the experience of 
unity as well as that of conflict. Thus, as a 
phenomonological ontology, Being and Nothingness remains 
seriously flawed.
But if it can be said that Sartre goes too far in one 
direction, it must be said that Marx goes too far in the 
other. If Marx's characterization of man is correct, if 
man's historical and continually developing needs are always 
accompanied by an appropriating power available to fulfill 
them, then the possibility of man completely transcending 
his alienated condition is realistic, given the proper 
historical circumstances. If man is really only an embodied 
potential awaiting actualization in and through the world, 
then all hope is far from lost. But if not, if man actually 
has needs and desires that he is powerless to meet, then it 
must be said that Marx has historicized, to some extent, an 
ontological condition - he awaits a day that even the 
"positive transcendence" of private property cannot 
overcome.
It seems the latter is the case. As the comparison of 
the above two positions has shown, Marx's portrayal of 
communist man is a clear cut exemplification of man's desire
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for the founding of his being, the theme that has run 
throughout Being and Nothingness. Since Marx has allowed 
for the identification of the individual with his species, 
the founding of being has become a social project; whereas 
for Sartre, for whom the self is privatized and "atomized", 
it is an individual project. Clearly the joint effort makes 
the task more plausible, but is it enough?
To the extent that man develops himself in his 
unalienated productive activity and to the extent that his 
object serves as an objectification of himself, man has 
created himself. And to the extent that men live together
in a sense of community, that is, in as much as the
individual is an individual only as a species being and as
such, "is just as much the totality", man stands at the 
source of himself.[144] But is that enough? Will the "gift" 
Marxist man wishes to take back from God, i.e., man's 
"potential for achievement" leave him with the sense of
control and security he seeks?[145] Will he really become 
that "social being who in cooperation with his fellows rules 
over nature" and creates himself?[146]
It seems unlikely. The "taking up, supersceding and 
revolutionizing pre-established immediate facticity" that 
Marcuse has claimed is communist man's project is always 
incomplete and, to some extent, failed.[147] We change the
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world, but the world gets away from us once again somehow. 
In curing one type of cancer, we give a man another type. 
In solving the problem of scarcity, we have polluted • our 
world. In attempting to help the poor, we manage somehow to 
further degrade them. These "disasters" are of course 
historically contingent; we can imagine a more advanced 
agro-biology and an improved social services system which 
might remedy these ills. But it is precisely because all 
projects do take place in history that they so often take an 
unforseen course. That is, we cannot, in principle, forsee 
all the effects any particualar action may bring about. We 
do not have, nor can we forsee having, the grasp on the 
world that Marx envisioned us having. The naive hope to the 
contrary, born of the enlightenment mentality, has wrought 
unprecedented destruction. In attempting to "control" his 
world, man has succeeded in destroying much of it.
This is not to say that all projects take this perverse 
twist- man has made real progress in many areas. Even 
"failed" projects can be successful in bringing men 
together, thereby creating bonds where none existed before. 
Man's labors are by no means totally futile or without 
reward. But facticity evades us - our attempts to usurp it, 
transform it, often backfire, and while we are far from 
helpless in this world, we can never gain the control, the 
sense of oneness with the world or with one another that
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Marx hoped for.
But this does not mean that our efforts will be wholly 
ineffective against the layering of alienation that is not 
ontological; nor does it mean that we must not try to 
achieve a greater unity among men and between man and world. 
In fact, Sartre argues that it is just our nature to do so. 
The groundedness, justification and self-control i.e., the 
being of man as the desire for the in-itself-for-itself, is 
not without consequence: It is the carrot which dangles
from the stick attached to the donkey's yoke - it is that 
which propells us forward, yet that which we can never 
attain; it is at once our frustration and our motivation.
Sartre, then, must be given his due. While his 
analysis is unbalanced, his focus on the element of failure 
in the human quest for "totality" tempers the enlightenment 
mentality (which has brought about more than a few 
"advances" reeking of failure and destruction) without 
leaving man paralyzed. Sartrean man acts not in defiance of 
God, but in hopes to become God. He falls short of his 
vision, of course, but his failures are often fruitful (he 
creates and he loves, if only momentarily) and his quest 
continues. In man's failure to become God he becomes human 
- and, as the Ancient Greeks recognized, there is inevitably 
a hint of tragedy in his condition. Man was born to "outdo"
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himself - this is both the bulk of Sartre's message and the 
crux of Marx's project, neither of which should be wholly 
abandoned.
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10.0 NOTES
1. Raymond Aron, Marxism and Existentialism 
(New York, 1970), p. 37.
2. By "God", here, I am referring only to 
Sartre's conception of God. There are 
undoubtedly richer and more complex 
conceptions that far surpass what Marx 
expects Communist man to attain.
3. This paper deals exclusively with Marx's 
Ths. Economic and Philosophic Man yi,scripts 
of 1844 and Sartre's Bei ng and 
Nothingness. Reference to Sartre's 
specifically Marxist work, The Critique 
of Dialectical Reason, has been omitted 
for the following reasons: 1) It remains 
philosophically less interesting as an analysis 
of alienation. 2) Sartre's views in this latter 
work have not changed substantially from those 
presented in Being and Nothingness. He is 
still unable to find grounds from more than 
fleeting moments of intersubjectivity; genuine 
camaraderie comes about during the "storming"
of the barricades, after which social relations 
become refied and enforced. Also, he still focuses 
on the element of failure in human projects. He 
coins the term "practico-inert" to refer to the 
unforseen factors which alienate men from their 
intended ends.
4. Jean-Paul Sartre, Being S M  Nothingness 
(New York, 1956), p. 24.
5. Klaus Hartmann, Sartre's Ontology 
(Evanston, 1966) p. 35.
6. Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness 
(New York, 1956), pp. 32-34.
7. Just how or why this takes place Sartre never makes 
clear.
8. Sartre, p. 81.
9. Ibid., p. 82.
10. Ibid.
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11. Ibid., p. 4.
12. Ibid., p. 23.
13. Ibid.
14. "Negatite" is a term coined by Sartre to refer
to those experiences which reflect the negating power 
of consciousness.
15. Sartre, p. 127.
16. Ibid., p. 74.
17. Ibid., p. 87.
18. Ibid., p. 24.
19. By "facticity" Sartre means all that we encounter
that cannot be chosen by us. This includes the many
particulars of our situation: our sex, our race,
birthplace, physique, etc. Our past becomes 
facticity, not because we have not at one time
chosen it, but because once posited as "past",
it can no longer be chosen. That is, we cannot 
undo it or choose a different past, just as we 
cannot choose to be born elsewhere. Past qua 
past takes on the dead character of the in-itself.
20. Sartre f P. 121
21. Ibid., P. 126.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., P. 439.
24. Ibid., P. 89.
.inCM Ibid., P. 350.
26. Ibid., P. 560.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid., P. 90.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid., P. 566.
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31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
Ibid. P* 79.
Ibid. P. •o
CO
Ibid. P- 575.
Ibid. P. 566.
Ibid. P. 597.
Ibid.
Ibid. P- 84.
Ibid. P. 598.
Ibid. P. 87.
Ibid. P. 90.
Ibid. P. 615.
Bertell Oilman, Alienation (Cambridge, 1971),
p. 110.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 137.
Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscrip 
of 1844 (New York, 1965), p. 113.
Ibid., p. 108.
Ibid.
Oilman, p. 95.
Marx, p. 113.
Herbert Marcuse, "The Foundations of Historical 
Materialism" in Negations (Boston, 1968), p. 13.
Marx, p. 112.
Ibid., p. 107.
Ibid., p. 108.
Ibid., p. 110.
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55. Oilman, p. 137.
56. For Marx, all labor, alienated or otherwise, results 
in objectification. That is, all man's interactions 
with the world express, to some extent, his powers.
But when man's labor is coerced, when he is forced
to do menial and tedious labor, his expression is 
inhibited and the resulting objectification is 
distorted.
57. Marx, p. 175.
58. Ibid., p. 110.
59. Oilman,, p. 145.
60. Ibid., p. 147.
61. Ibid., p. 203.
62. Ibid., p. 150.
63. Marx, p. 135.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid, p. 133.
66. Marcuse, p. 32.
67. This analysis presupposes that man, in the 
absence of coersion, is free, that he is not
a wholly determined being. Marx, while commenting 
only briefly on the possibility of free choice, 
establishes this autonomy much the same way Sartre 
does: He claims that man's life "is an object
for him. Only because of this is his activity 
free activity". (Marx, p. 133) It is, as 
with Sartre, man's "presence" to himself 
and to his world that allows for the possibility 
of free choice. For Marx, however, this consciousness 
of self and world directs our engagement with the 
world; for Sartre, it is directly responsible for 
our disengagement.
68. Oilman, p. 101.
69. Marx felt that the promise of technology layed in
its potential to liberate man from tiresome and tedious 
labor. He foresaw a nearly fully automated production
Page 79
system which would require very little maintenance 
and supervision. To the extent that enervating 
work would be required, it would be shared among 
members of the community.
70. While Marx speaks of alienated labor as if it were an 
"all or nothing" affair, it is obvious that there are 
degrees of alienated labor. For example, even in a 
capitalistic society, a painter or a novelist is 
expressing and developing himself in his work far 
more than a factory worker. If, however, his 
artistic activity is also his livlihood, then 
alienation seeps in. If he is forced by his 
financial circumstances to "create" that which will 
sell, then his own tastes and inclinations may very 
well be overriden by market demands. Even if he
is independently wealthy, and creates "freely" 
in this sense, he is immersed in an alienated 
society and therefore inevitably suffers alienated 
relations with his fellow man. Thus, while he
may be in some respects more fortunate than those
doing menial labor, Marx would still characterize him 
as "alienated". His product, then, will somehow 
reflect that alienation.
71. Marx, p. 139.
72. Ibid., p. 138.
73. Istvan Meszaros, Marx * s Theory of Alienation 
(New York, 1970), p. 202-203.
74. Oilman, p. 90.
75. Ibid., p. 89.
76. Ibid., p. 91.
77. Ibid., p. 93.
78. Ibid., pp. 107-108.
79. Marcuse, p. 34.
80. Marx, p. 137.
81. Meszaros, p. 258.
82. Oilman, p. 105.
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83. Ibid., p. 106.
84. Ibid.
85. Marx, p. 140.
86. Ibid., p. 141.
87. Ibid., p. 144.
88. There are, however, other alternatives. Camus,
for example, gives us the "absurd man" who takes 
neither of these routes.
89. Marx, p. 144.
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid., p. 145.
92. Ibid.
93. Sartre, p. 576.
94. Ibid.
95. Ibid., p. 577.
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid., p. 582.
99. Marx, p. 114.
100. Sartre, p. 591.
101. Ibid., p. 576. In the original French edition Sartre
uses the verb "faire". translatable as "to make" or
"to do".
102. Ibid.
103. Ibid., p. 590.
104. Ibid., p. 588.
105. Ibid., p. 591.
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106. Ibid., p. 592.
107. Ibid., p. 593.
108. Meszaros, p. 118.
109. Sartre, p. 581.
110. Ibid., p. 87.
111. In the Critique of Dialectical Reason. Sartre,
in attempting to allign himself with Marx, allows 
"need" (not "lack") to drive his dialectic. This 
"need", however, unlike Marx's, retains its 
passive character, as Sartre fails to emphasize 
the "powers" which seek expression through man's 
need.
112. Wilfrid Desan, The Tragic Finale (New York, 1960), 
p. 55.
113. Marx, p. 139.
114. Ibid., p. 138.
115. Ibid., p. 139.
116. Ibid., p. 137.
117. Sartre, p. 364.
118. Ibid., p. 221.
119. Ibid., p. 259.
120. Ibid., p. 262.
121. Ibid., p. 399.
122. Ibid., p. 405.
123. Ibid.
124. It should be emphasized that this is Sartre's 
interpretation of Heidegger. Another reading may 
find Heidegger far more concerned with the
individual qua individual than has Sartre.
125. Sartre, p. 247.
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126. Ibid., p. 245.
127. Ibid., p. 246.
128. Ibid.
129. Ibid.
130. Ibid.
131. Ibid.
132. Ibid., p. 247.
133. Ibid.
134. This is a debatable issue, but since it is not 
Heidegger's analysis of the social realm, but Sartre's 
reaction to Heidegger's analysis that interests us 
here, the issue will remain unexplored.
135. Sartre, p. 421.
136. Ibid., p. 419.
137. Ibid., p. 425.
138. Ibid.
139. Ibid.
140. Ibid., p. 429.
141. Ibid.
142. Ibid., p. 425.
143. Ibid., p. 429.
144. Marx, p. 138.
145. Oilman, p. 223.
146. Ibid.
147. Marcuse, p. 47.
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